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We investigate methods to vaccinate contact networks—i.e. removing nodes in such a way that disease
spreading is hindered as much as possible—with respect to their cost-efficiency. Any real implementation
of such protocols would come with costs related both to the vaccination itself, and gathering of information
about the network. Disregarding this, we argue, would lead to erroneous evaluation of vaccination pro-
tocols. We use the susceptible-infected-recovered model—the generic model for diseases making patients
immune upon recovery—as our disease-spreading scenario, and analyze outbreaks on both empirical and
model networks. For different relative costs, different protocols dominate. For high vaccination costs and
low costs of gathering information, the so-called acquaintance vaccination is the most cost efficient. For
other parameter values, protocols designed for query-efficient identification of the network’s largest degrees
are most efficient.
I. INTRODUCTION
Infectious disease is a major burden to global health. In-
fections spread from person to person over human contact
networks. The propagation speed is an emergent property
of both the pathogenesis in the infected individual and the
contacts between people. By understanding the contact
networks, we should thus be able to better predict and mit-
igate disease outbreaks. These are the premises of network
epidemiology [1, 2]—one of its most active questions being
how to exploit the contact network in targeted vaccination
campaigns [3, 4]. Until now, targeted vaccination has mostly
been a theoretical topic. The medical practice of network-
based immunization has been very limited to both few cases
and simple methods—the most famous being “ring vacci-
nation” [5]. This strategy was used to eradicate smallpox
and works by vaccinating all network neighbors of an in-
fectious person [6]. Nevertheless, network immunization
could be important in future disease control, especially for
sexually transmitted infections (where the network links are
evident) [7] or livestock diseases (where one node is a farm
and links are connections by transport) [8].
In the theoretical literature, the problem of targeted vac-
cination has typically been formulated as follows. Given
some knowledge of the contact network, identify the in-
dividuals that are potentially most important for disease
spreading. To carry out a targeted vaccination campaign,
one would first need to gather information about the con-
tact network, then use this information to vaccinate (or
otherwise reduce the impact of the important individuals).
There are thus three major costs involved in such an en-
deavor: the cost of the disease itself (that we can use as our
base unit), the cost of gathering the information about the
network cinfo (in units of the cost of a person getting the dis-
ease) and the cost of vaccinating cvacc. We can thus evaluate
the cost efficiency of a vaccination protocol by measuring
the net saving χ per person in units of the cost of sick indi-
viduals
Nχ( f )=Ω−Ω′( f )−N f cvacc−n( f )cinfo (1)
where Ω and Ω′ are the expected outbreak sizes (number
of individual who had the disease after it became extinct)
respectively without and with using vaccinations, N is the
number of individuals, f is the fraction of individuals to vac-
cinate and n is the number of inquiries needed to obtain in-
formation. Obviously, Ω correspond to the no-vaccination
scenario and thus does not depend on f . Both n andΩ′ de-
pend on the specific vaccination protocol, but we drop this
information in Eq. (1) for brevity.
By reformulating the vaccination problem as a cost-
optimization problem, one can evaluate the protocols pro-
posed in the literature in a way more useful for decision
makers. In this paper, we use this approach to evaluate
eight vaccination protocols for many kinds of cost scenarios
and underlying networks. We use eight different empirical
networks of human contacts (representing sexual interac-
tion or proximity). We also use the configuration model—a
popular method to generate synthetic uncorrelated random
networks given a degree sequence.
Before proceeding to the details of our approach we will
give a brief overview of the recent analytical advances on
the vaccination problem. The simplest vaccination proto-
col is just to vaccinate random individuals—the Random (R)
protocol—which often serves as a baseline in the literature,
see e.g. Refs. [9–12]. In a seminal paper, Cohen, Havlin and
ben Avraham [9] proposed the more effective Acquaintance
(A) vaccination. In their approach, one also starts by ran-
domly selected individuals, but does not vaccinate these,
rather, asks them to name someone they met (in such a way
that contagion could occur). In an uncorrelated network,
the probability of meeting a node of degree k in such an
approach, is proportional to k. It is important to vaccinate
high-degree nodes, not only because they have more peo-
ple to spread the disease to, but also more people to get the
disease from.
Let fc denote the fraction of population that must be vac-
cinated in order to prevent a global outbreak. Formally, as
N →∞, fc = inf{ f : Ω′( f )/N = o(1)}, and we will use a su-
perscript for fc to denote a specific vaccination protocol. It
was shown numerically in Refs. [9, 10] that f Ac < f Rc . An im-
plicit analytical expression for f Ac in uncorrelated networks
(configuration model) was derived in Ref. [10]. Similar re-
sults were obtained in Ref. [11] for a more general model
of infection spreading, in Ref. [13] for imperfect vaccine,
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2and in Ref. [14] for the weighted configuration model, where
weights of the edges represent contact probabilities.
A large empirical study based on the 2006 census of
the Greater Toronto Area [12] suggests that vaccination of
top-degree nodes—the Degree (D) vaccination protocol—is
most effective. However, such strategy requires informa-
tion about the entire network, which makes it hard to im-
plement. For analytical results on degree-based vaccination
and an implicit expression for f Dc , we refer to Ref. [11]. In
this paper by optimizing Eq. (1) rather that fc , we confirm
that the Degree protocol is never the most efficient one: in
all scenarios, the cost of the complete knowledge does not
justify the gain inΩ′.
In addition to the Acquaintance protocol, we consider
two strategies, recently developed for quick detection of
high-degree nodes: the Random walk (RW) strategy [15],
and the Two-step heuristic (TSH) [16]. We also consider
two other protocols that require complete knowledge of the
network—Coreness and Collective influence (CI). See below
for a complete description of all protocols.
II. METHODS
In this section we introduce the methods, data sets and
network models we use.
A. SIR simulation
We assume that an infectious disease is spreading over a
static contact network represented as a graph G = (V ,E). V
is the set of N vertices, or nodes, representing individuals; E
is the set of M undirected edges representing pairs of indi-
viduals between whom the disease may spread. The nodes
are, at any given time, in one of three states—susceptible
(S), infectious (I) or recovered (R). Susceptible nodes do not
have the disease, but can get it. Infectious nodes have the
disease and they can spread it. Recovered nodes do not have
the disease and cannot get it. We assume a disease outbreak
starts at time t = 0. At the beginning all nodes are suscep-
tible, except a randomly chosen node that is infectious. If
an edge is between one susceptible individual and one in-
fected individual, then the susceptible becomes infectious
at rate β. Every infectious recovers at rate ν. In this set-
ting, the infection and recovery times are independent ex-
ponential random variables, and an infectious node trans-
fers a disease through an edge before getting recovered with
probability β/(β+ν).
The SIR model is essentially determined by the ratio be-
tween β and ν. In the well-mixed, differential equation ver-
sion of the SIR model, this ratio is called R0. The actual val-
ues of β and ν are only needed to calculate the time to reach
the peak prevalence, extinction etc. In this paper, we set
ν = 1 which is equivalent to saying that we are measuring
the time in units of 1/ν. In order to simulate this model, it
is efficient to perform one infection or recovery event every
iteration of the algorithm. The probability of the next event
being an infection is
βMSI
βMSI+NI
, (2)
where MSI is the number of edges between infectious and
susceptible individuals, and NI is the prevalence (number
of infectious individuals [17]). The time increment since
the last iteration is, on average, 1/(βMSI +NI). Thus, to
record time (in units of 1/ν), one adds this amount every
iteration to a variable representing time, which results in a
discretized version of the system. (We note that since our
analysis is based only on average characteristics of the sys-
tem, such discretization does not affect the results.) If an
infection event is not performed, one performs a recovery
event. In an infection event, the S-I edge is chosen ran-
domly among all S-I links. Similarly, in case of a recovery
event, the infectious individual (to recover) is selected uni-
formly at random among all infectious individuals.
For all contact networks and parameter values, we use
300,000 or more runs of the SIR model for averages. Since
each run represents an independent realization of the (ran-
dom) costs of the entire process, we used the normal ap-
proximation of the sample average, to verify with 99% confi-
dence intervals that our evaluations of mean costs were very
accurate. The exact values of the confidence intervals are
not informative for our purpose and thus are omitted. We
use β = 1/32,1/16,1/8,1/4,1/2,1,2,4,8,16,32 and (as men-
tioned) ν= 1.
B. Vaccination protocols
We compare the performance of seven vaccination
protocols—five of these have been analyzed in the litera-
ture, and two are proposed by us in this work (but derived
from a cost-efficient way of finding the highest degree ver-
tices). The vaccination protocols range from simple to com-
plex and use different amount of information about the net-
work.
1. Random vaccination
The simplest way of vaccinating a fraction f of a popula-
tion is to just pick f N persons uniformly at random [18]. In
this case, we can assume the information cost to be zero as
all we need is a list of contact information of the population.
2. Acquaintance vaccination
An elegant way of exploiting the network structure to find
high-degree individuals to vaccinate is the Acquaintance
vaccination scheme by Cohen, Havlin and ben Avraham [9].
In the literature it is often assumed that each individual
is sampled a Poisson( f ) distributed number of times, and
each time a sampled individual names one neighbor to vac-
cinate. When the neighbor has already been vaccinated, no
3vaccination occurs and the next individual is sampled ran-
domly. Then, the average fraction of vaccinated individuals
v( f ) is smaller than f . The exact formula for v( f ) is given
e.g. in Refs. [10, 11]. Naturally, v( f ) is close to f when f
is small. Here we assume that when a randomly sampled
individual names a contact, which has already been vacci-
nated, then the individual is asked to name another contact.
We discard the rare cases when all contacts of a random
individual have already been vaccinated, and thus assume
that v( f ) = f . Then the information cost of this protocol is
f N cinfo, since one needs to make an inquiry to one node for
every node that is vaccinated.
3. Random-walk vaccination
If one is willing to spend more effort on mapping out the
network, one can do significantly better than the acquain-
tance vaccination in finding the high-degree vertices. This
is the idea of Random walk vaccination. Under this heuris-
tics one keeps a list of the f N vertices with highest observed
degree that is updated during a random walk of inquiries.
This is based on Ref. [15] that proposed this method to find
high-degree nodes in the World Wide Web and social net-
works in a cost-efficient way. Let ki be the degree of node
i . When the random walk is at node i , it jumps to a random
node with probability α/(ki +α), and with complementary
probability it proceeds to a randomly chosen neighbor of i .
The rationale is that the stationary probability of i in such
random walk is proportional to ki +α. We use α= 3 follow-
ing the recommendation from Ref. [15] that α should be of
the order of the average degree. This value will be the same
in all networks because the performance is robust with re-
spect to α. The second parameter m is the number of steps
in the random walk. Rather than fixing this parameter, we
will use the value that optimizes χ.
The cost of this protocol is the number of steps the ran-
dom walk continues to a neighbor of the present node
(rather than jumping to a random node) times cinfo. (On av-
erage, in stationarity, the information costs are mcinfo(1−
α/(〈k〉+α)), cf. Ref. [15].
4. Two-step heuristic
We also try a protocol that, like the Random walk in the
previous section, was developed to cost-efficiently identify
high-degree nodes in social media. We call it the Two-step
heuristic (TSH). Just like Random walk it has a parameter
to tune the amount of information used in the search pro-
cess [16]. This protocol consist of two stages. In the first
stage, one randomly chooses n1 nodes and considers a re-
duced network of these n1 nodes and their neighbors. In
the second stage one measures the exact degrees of the n2
highest-degree nodes of the reduced network. For simplic-
ity, we set n1 = n2 = n (which is not far off the expected opti-
mal parameter setting [16]). This gives n( f ,G)= 2n, and the
total information cost 2ncinfo.
5. Degree
Since both Random walk and TSH aim at being cost-
efficient methods to rank nodes according to their degree,
we also use the correct values of the degree (which could
only be obtained by knowing the entire network). The in-
formation cost of this protocol is thus N cinfo. This has also
been discussed as a vaccination protocol [18].
6. Coreness
There are other structures than degree that could be ex-
ploited for mitigating disease spreading. Coreness captures,
not only the degree of a node, but also increases with the
connectedness of a node’s neighborhood. The idea that
dense clusters (“core groups” in the epidemiological liter-
ature) are important for disease spreading dates back to
Ref. [19]. Coreness is not the only metric to capture this
property, but a simple and straightforward one. It is the
byproduct of a k-core decomposition, which is a way to an-
alyze the network by successively removing nodes from it.
Specifically, at level k, one deletes all nodes with degree≤ k.
If nodes get degree ≤ k during the deletion process, one
deletes these too, until all nodes have degrees larger than
k. The coreness value of a node is the k-value when it was
deleted.
The coreness as an estimate of importance with respect
to disease spreading was proposed by Ref. [20], and further
refined in Ref. [21]. To use it, one would need to map out
the entire network, i.e. all its M edges. However, in reality,
the inquiries will be implemented node by node. Therefore,
we choose a simplified approach, in which we assume that
knowing the complete network takes one inquiry per node,
i.e. the total information cost is N cinfo. Note that this is a
more demanding inquiry, because it requires an individual
to list all its neighbors. Still, we use the same cost, mean-
ing the performance of Coreness relative to its cost will be
slightly overestimated compared to the above protocols.
7. Collective influence
Finally, we use a yet more elaborate algorithm that, like
coreness, requires full information about the network. We
stick with the author’s rather non-descriptive name Collec-
tive Influence (CI) [22]. It starts by defining a quantity
xl (i )= (ki −1)
∑
j :d(i , j )=l
(k j −1) (3)
where ki is the degree (number of neighbors) of i , d(i , j ) is
the distance (fewest number of edges in any path) between
i and j . The algorithm proceeds by deleting the node of
largest xl (i ), then recalculating xl for the reduced network
and repeating the procedure until f N nodes are deleted. As
l grows, the ranking stabilizes but the computation time in-
creases. The choice of l is thus a trade-off between speed
4and precision. We follow Ref. [22] and set l = 3. Just like
coreness, the collective influence needs all the network in-
formation. Thus the total cost of information gathering is
N cinfo.
C. Networks
Ideally, the underlying network of our study should be
as realistic as possible (given a pathogen). Our knowl-
edge of the structure of contact networks is advancing, and
there are some datasets available. We use the ones that
record actual contacts between people and disregard those
where contacts are inferred from interaction on social me-
dia, etc. [23]. To better understand how the size of the net-
work, and higher-order structures, affect the performance
of the algorithms, it is desirable to have models able to gen-
erate contact networks. We study one of the simplest such
models—the configuration model—not because it is able to
generate a network with very realistic structure, but because
it enables us to compare the result to other studies, in par-
ticular analytical ones.
1. Configuration model
The input to the configuration model is a degree se-
quence, i.e. a sequence of desired degrees of the nodes of
the network. Then the model proceeds by picking random
pairs of nodes and adding an edge between them if their ac-
tual degrees are less than their desired degrees. When all
nodes has their desired degree, the network has been con-
structed. The model does not enforce a simple graph (i.e.
if there are already edges between a selected pair of nodes,
one would still add another edge, and links from a vertex
to itself are also allowed). Since the empirical graphs in
our study are simple graphs by construction, we convert
the output of the configuration model to a simple graph by
deleting multiple edges and self-loops. In the literature this
construction is sometimes called the erased configuration
model [24].
Like many previous studies, we focus on networks with a
power-law degree distribution, so the probability of a ver-
tex having degree k is proportional to k−γ. We truncate the
degree distribution at N 1/(γ−1). Such truncation improves
the precision of the estimated average values of the infec-
tion outbreak, and at the same time it preserves the limiting
degree distribution and the order of magnitude of the max-
imum degree.
The parameter values we use are: γ = 2.5 (as a typical
value of empirical networks) and N = 625, 1,250, 2,500,
5,000, or 10,000. We generate 100 networks of each com-
bination of parameter values.
TABLE I. Basic statistics of the data sets. N is the number of in-
dividuals; M is the number of links. x is the connectance (frac-
tion of vertex pairs that are links). C is the clustering coefficient
of the original network and C ′ denotes the averaged values of ran-
dom graphs with the same expected degree sequence as the origi-
nal network [25].
Data set N M x C C’
HIV 40 41 0.052 0.034 0.094
Colorado Springs 324 345 0.004 0.026 0.029
Iceland 75 114 0.041 0.16 0.20
Prostitution 16,730 39,044 0.0002 0 0.010
Conference 113 2,196 0.34 0.50 0.48
Hospital 75 1,139 0.41 0.58 0.57
School 1 236 5,901 0.21 0.43 0.28
School 2 238 5,541 0.20 0.47 0.27
2. Empirical networks
The first type of empirical networks that we use repre-
sent self-reported sexual contacts. Two of these data sets—
we label them HIV and Colorado Springs—were gathered
by so called contact tracing where individuals testing pos-
itive with HIV were required to report their recent contacts.
HIV data set is from the first study [26], which used an ob-
served contact network between HIV patients to argue that
HIV is a sexually transmitted disease. Colorado Springs is
a larger and more recent contact-tracing data set based on
patients from its namesake city in Colorado, USA [27]. Con-
tact tracing does not follow contacts of uninfected individu-
als, indeed HIV only includes positive cases while Colorado
Springs also includes uninfected individuals that had sex
with HIV positive others.
We also use two networks of self-reported sexual contacts
not related to contact tracing. One (Iceland) comes from
Icelandic men who have sex with men [28]. The other (Pros-
titution) from a Brazilian web forum where sex buyers re-
port their encounters with prostitutes [29].
The final type of empirical networks are so called proxim-
ity networks. In these, a link represent a pair of people being
close to each other at some time. These data sets all come
from the Sociopatterns project (sociopatterns.org) and were
collected by radio-frequency identification sensors given to
people in some specific social setting. Such sensors record a
contact if two persons are within 1–1.5 m. The social setting
of one of these data sets is a conference [30] (Conference),
another is a hospital [31] (Hospital) and the final one is from
a school (School 1 and 2) [32].
The original proximity data sets along with Prostitution
are time resolved. We construct static networks by ag-
gregating all contacts. (Ideally these data sets should be
analyzed as temporal networks [33]—then one could get
around the assumption that the past accurately predicts the
future [34, 35]. However, that is outside the scope of this pa-
per.)
We list the basic statistics—sizes, sampling durations,
etc.—of the data sets in Table I.
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FIG. 1. An example of the cost efficiency of different vaccination strategies. Here we use the Colorado Springs network as a function of
the costs of information retrieval and vaccination and β= 2.
III. RESULTS
A. Numerical results
We start by evaluating the vaccination protocols in some
detail for the Colorado Springs data set. Then we proceed
to take a cruder look at all the data sets to see how network
structure affects the results.
1. A case study
The Colorado Springs network serves well as an exam-
ple since it is of intermediate size in our collection and has
typical features, such as a heterogeneous degree distribu-
tion. In this section we set β = 2—once again choosing
a modest value that is in the interesting range where dis-
ease can spread throughout the population. In Fig. 1, we
plot the optimal saved cost Nχopt as a function of the two
parameters—the relative cost of information cinfo and the
relative cost of vaccination cvacc. The general pattern is
quite trivial—the protocols needing most information (CI,
Degree and Coreness) are also the ones that depend most on
cinfo, while Random, that needs no information at all, de-
pends only on cvacc. The three protocols using an amount of
information depending on f (Acquaintance, Random walk
and TSH) are affected by both cinfo and cvacc. From the heat
maps it is hard to see which protocol is the best (except, per-
haps that Acquaintance has the largestχ for large cinfo). This
means that the efficiencies of the best-performing protocols
are relatively similar.
The performance of the protocols can be better under-
stood by measuring the fraction of vertices fopt needed to
be vaccinated to optimize the total costs. See Fig. 2. The
protocols where the information costs do not depend on f
obviously have no cinfo dependence. For the other ones—
Acquaintance, Random walk and TSH— fopt decreases with
both cvacc and cinfo. Hence, more information does make
these protocols more accurate. This can be seen even more
clearly in Fig. 3 where we set f = fopt and study the opti-
mal parameter values (mopt and nopt) of the Random walk
and TSH protocols. Both the protocols naturally have larger
values of their parameters the cheaper the information is.
For Random walk the optimal m-value is largest when cinfo
is as small and cvacc as large as possible. Large cvacc gives
small optimal f (see Fig. 2) which lowers the cost needed
for gathering information. For large cvacc and small cinfo the
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FIG. 2. The optimal fraction of vaccinated vertices for the same situation as in Fig. 1.
relative cost for information gathering is thus so small that
the rather small marginal benefit of longer random walks is
still affordable.
For the TSH protocol the largest parameter value is at an
intermediate value of cvacc (still cinfo is as small as possible).
One can understand the increase of the parameter value
with cvacc in a similar way as for Random walk. The eventual
decrease, for cvacc ≈ 0.1, as well as other non-monotonicities
in the plot, can be related to how Ω′ responds to changing
fopt.
2. Network-structural effects
The picture painted in the previous section remains
roughly true for other data sets and β values. In this section,
we go directly to our main question of what the most cost
effective vaccination protocol is. Figure 4 shows the results
for β = 2. The corresponding figure for the other β-values
we study can be found in the Supplementary material. From
these figures, the conclusions are roughly the same, but for
small β, i.e. small outbreak sizes, the results are affected by
noise (so the regions are not that clear cut).
For most of the data sets, Acquaintance vaccination is
the most efficient protocol for relatively large information
costs, TSH is the most efficient for low cinfo and large cvacc,
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FIG. 3. The parameter values optimizing the Random walk and
TSH strategies. The plot shows the same network and as a func-
tion of the same parameters as in Fig. 1.
while Random walk is the most efficient for the rest of the
parameter space. One exception is the Prostitution—the
largest and sparsest network—where CI is the most cost
effective (despite the fact it requires global knowledge of
the network structure). This network also has zero cluster-
ing coefficient—i.e. no triangles (because only heterosex-
ual contacts are recorded). Still, the size and sparsity seem
like more fundamental differences to the other networks (cf.
Ref. [36]). To understand the role of clustering one could
perform the same study on model networks where the clus-
tering can be controlled. The densest network, Hospital, is
also different in the respect that TSH performs best for the
entire parameter space. Random is never the most efficient,
meaning that there are network structures that can be ex-
ploited for all data sets and parameter values. Coreness and
Degree does not perform best under any circumstance.
In addition to the empirical contact networks, we also
study scale-free networks of different sizes. See Fig. 5. These
networks behave slightly differently from the empirical net-
works with CI dominating the large-cvacc small-cinfo region,
Acquaintance dominating the small-cvacc large-cinfo region,
Random walk being the best for the region of intermediate
cvacc and cinfo, and TSH being the best protocol for some low
cinfo values and intermediate cvacc values.
3. Analysis of the optimal f
In this section our goal is to understand regularities be-
hind the numerical results. The exact analysis is available
only for asymptotic behavior of Random, Acquaintance and
Degree strategies in a configuration model, see e.g. [10, 11],
but the analytical expressions are cumbersome, and do not
provide sufficient qualitative insights. The results on other
vaccination strategies are currently not available. Therefore,
we resort to heuristic arguments, that are based on the exact
results in the literature.
Dividing both parts of Eq. (1) by N , we write
χ( f )=∆( f )− f cvacc− [n( f ,G)/N ]cinfo, (4)
where
∆( f )= (Ω−Ω′( f ))/N (5)
is the fraction of the population that have avoided the dis-
ease due to vaccination. For any vaccination strategy, ∆( f ),
obviously, increases in f . Furthermore, remember that fc is
the fraction of the population that needs to be vaccinated in
order to prevent a global outbreak. In other words, if f ≥ fc ,
then Ω′( f ) is negligible compared to N , so ∆( f ) ≈ Ω/N .
Moreover, one expects that for small ² > 0, the additional
gain ∆( f + ²)−∆( f ) decreases to zero when f approaches
fc . (This is closely related to subadditivity of spreading pro-
cesses, which is used, for example, in solving influence max-
imization problems [37].)
Following a widely used approach in epidemiology and
network science, consider a continuous version of Eq. (4),
where all functions of f ∈ [0,1] are differentiable and all van-
ishing terms are neglected. (We note that proving formally
that the process converges to its continuous representation
as N →∞ is a challenging mathematical problem, however,
it is common to analyze the continuous version on its own
rights.) In the continuous version of the system, our obser-
vations above can be summarized as follows: (i) ∆′( f ) > 0
for f < fc ; (ii) ∆( f ) = Ω/N and ∆′( f ) = 0 for f ≥ fc ; (iii)
∆′( f )→ 0 when f → fc . This behavior of ∆′( f ) is schemati-
cally depicted in Fig. 6.
We proceed with analyzing the optimal fraction of vacci-
nated individuals. The maximal gain in Eq. (4) is achieved
at f = fopt, which is a solution of
∆′( f )= cvacc+ [n′( f ,G)/N ]cinfo. (6)
Since n( f ,G) is non-decreasing in f , it follows that
∆′( fopt)> 0, so fopt < fc . One can now view fc as an indica-
tor of the effectiveness of a vaccination strategy in prevent-
ing the epidemics. Indeed, when fc is small, then the global
outbreak is prevented by vaccinating only a small fraction of
individuals. Consequently, one expects that fopt is smaller
for more effective strategies. Another indication for smaller
fopt is a higher value of the right-hand side of Eq. (6), as can
be easily seen in Fig. 6, where this value is represented by
the dashed line.
We will now compare fopt for different vaccination strate-
gies.
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FIG. 4. The most cost efficient vaccination strategies for empirical networks as a function of the costs of information retrieval and
vaccination. In this figure β= 2.
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FIG. 6. Schematic representation of ∆′( f ). The value ∆′( fopt) is
given by Eq. (6).
Random (R) vaccination strategy is most understood in
the literature. Assume that the underlying graph is a config-
uration model. If the degree distribution has a finite vari-
ance, then f Rc can be obtained directly from Eq. (3.5) in
Ref. [10] by equating the reproduction number to its criti-
cal value 1. Specifically, we have:
f Rc =max
{
1− 〈k〉〈k2〉−〈k〉 ·
β+ν
β
,0
}
, (7)
and the value is positive if the global outbreak occurs when
no vaccination takes place. When the variance is infinite,
as in our case γ = 2.5, then f Rc = 1, so the global outbreak
cannot be prevented by the random vaccination.
Applying Eq. (6) we obtain that f Ropt satisfies
∆′( f )= cvacc. (8)
When f Rc = 1, one expects that f Ropt is quite large for small
cvacc, and it decreases when cvacc becomes larger (see Fig. 6).
This is indeed the case in our case study in Fig. 2. We
can also explain the modest gain in Fig. 4 by relatively slow
growth of ∆( f ).
For the Acquaintance (A) strategy, in the configuration
model, f Ac ∈ (0,1) can be computed using Theorem 3.3 of
Ref. [10], as long as the reproduction number in Eq. (3.13) in
Ref. [10] is smaller than one. The optimal fraction of vacci-
nated individuals f Aopt satisfies
∆′( f )= cvacc+ cinfo. (9)
Compared to the Random strategy, the right-hand side has
an extra positive term. Moreover, for the same epidemic on
the same graph, it holds that f Ac < f Rc (except when f Ac =
f Rc = 1), see Ref. [10]. Hence, using Fig. 6, we deduce that
f Aopt should be considerably smaller than f
R
opt. We see that
this is indeed the case in Fig. 2.
The cost efficiency of Acquaintance and Random strate-
gies is harder to compare because Acquaintance targets
high-degree nodes while Random does not, but on the other
hand, Random has no information costs. To take extreme
examples, Random will yield higher gain on a regular graph,
while Acquaintance—on a star graph. In the case study in
Fig. 4, we see that the gain for the Acquaintance strategy is
similar to the one for the Random strategy, while in other
data sets Acquaintance outperforms other protocols espe-
cially when information costs are high, see Fig. 4.
Degree (D), Coreness (C) and CI strategies must be most
effective in the configuration model because they target the
nodes that have the highest potential for spreading the in-
fection. A formula for the average outbreak size in the con-
figuration model when nodes of degree s are removed with
given probability is given in Ref. [11], but these results do
not directly apply when fraction f of highest degree nodes
is removed.
The fraction fopt for these strategies satisfies the same
equation (8) as f Ropt, that is, ∆
′( f )= cvacc. A comparison be-
tween f Dopt and f
A
opt may go both ways, as is easily illustrated
by Fig. 6. On one hand, one expects that f Dc < f Ac , because
both strategies target high degree nodes, only Degree iden-
tifies them precisely while Acquaintance is just a heuristic.
On the other hand,∆′( fopt) is smaller for the Degree than for
the Acquaintance strategy. Same argument applies to Core-
ness and CI, however, these protocols do not per se target
nodes of large degrees, so depending on a network, f Cc and
f CIc might be smaller or larger than f
A
c .
In the case study in Fig. 2 we obtain f Dopt < f Aopt but
f Copt, f
CI
opt > f Aopt. Very large value of fopt, especially for Core-
ness in Fig. 2 signals that these strategies are in fact ineffi-
cient for the Colorado Springs case study. In Fig. 4, for the
same case study we observe that Degree, Coreness and CI
have a very small gain. The efficiency of CI on configura-
tion model (Fig. 5) and on the Prostitution data set in Fig. 4,
for similar values of the parameters, is an interesting finding
that deserves further research. Possible explanation can be
in a small number of triangles—the feature that the Prosti-
tution data set and configuration model share.
Finally, consider Random-walk (RW) and TSH strategies.
Since these protocols target nodes with large degrees, but do
not identify them precisely, one expects that the Degree pro-
tocol is more effective in preventing a global outbreak, but
not by much. Therefore, f RWc and f
TSH
c should be slightly
larger than f Degreec . The optimal value fopt satisfies
∆′( f )= cvacc+n′( f ,G)cinfo/N . (10)
For large enough N , we expect the last term above to be
small, so ∆′( fopt) is close to the one of the Degree proto-
col. Invoking Fig. 6, we expect that f RWopt and f
TSH
opt are close
to f Degreeopt , especially when cinfo is small, and they decrease
when cinfo increases. These are exactly the results in Fig. 2.
The net gain of Random walk and TSH should be consid-
erably higher than that of the Degree strategy when cinfo is
large enough. Indeed, we observe that the Degree strategy
never yields the largest gain.
The comparison of Random walk and TSH to the Ac-
quaintance strategy is trickier since the latter also tar-
gets high degree nodes but at lower costs. On the other
hand, the accuracy of Random walk and TSH is higher.
The comparison between the three randomized strategies—
Acquaintance, Random walk, and TSH—thus depends on
the interplay between accurate targeting and information
costs. This explains that the Acquaintance sometimes per-
forms better than Random walk and TSH.
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IV. DISCUSSION
We have discussed how to make theoretical studies of tar-
geted vaccination more practically useful for decision mak-
ers. Instead of evaluating vaccination protocols for some
scenario about what is known about the network, we eval-
uate methods based as a cost-benefit problem. From this
starting point, we have evaluated the cost efficiency of seven
network-based vaccination methods. There is not one uni-
versally best method. Rather, depending on the network
structure and relative vaccination and information costs,
the best method (at least for the network and parameters
we explore) seem to be one of four—Acquaintance, TSH, CI
and Random walk. We make this point both by analytical
calculations and simulations.
Acquaintance vaccination is almost always the most effi-
cient for small cvacc and large cinfo. It is the protocol that
uses second least network information after Random. For
very large cinfo, Random will trivially be the most efficient
(keep in mind that cinfo can, in principle, be larger than
one), but we never observe this. TSH dominates the region
of large cvacc and small cinfo, for denser networks (for sparser
networks CI could also be most efficient). Random walk
dominates intermediate values of cvacc and cinfo. It is hard to
speculate why, but it is probably related to the fact that the
optimal parameter values of TSH change quickly for small
cinfo (Fig. 3). In other words, one can tune the performance-
to-cost balance more, meaning that this protocol is more
adaptable than Random walk in this region. CI performs
well for sparse networks with few triangles, especially in the
region of large cvacc and small cinfo. Degree is never most ef-
ficient, meaning that vaccinating exactly in order of degree
is not so important that it is worth obtaining all the network
information. Furthermore, Coreness is also never most ef-
ficient, supporting Refs. [38] and [22] (but disagreeing with
Ref. [20]).
In practical applications, one would in principle need to
know the parameters, both for the SIR model and to cal-
culate the cost [4]. For e.g. sexually transmitted diseases,
this is not impossible. If one, would base a pilot HIV pre-
exposure prophylaxis campaign on mapping a sexual net-
work like Ref. [28] (which, in addition to the network it-
self, could give the contact rates), then one could assume
a per-contact transmission probability of 1–2% [39]. Fur-
thermore, the societal cost for a positive HIV case is well un-
derstood [40]. With these parameters at hand, it should be
possible to narrow down the protocols to one or two.
To proceed towards increasing realism and applicabil-
ity, one would also need to take social mechanisms into
account. Parallel to the targeted immunization problem,
there is an emergent field studying vaccination as a social-
psychological problem. One issue being that for voluntary
vaccination it is irrational to become vaccinated if almost
everyone else is vaccinated (the diseases would not spread
anyway, and there are side-effects and discomfort associ-
ated with being vaccinated). Conversely, it is irrational not
to vaccinate if almost nobody is vaccinate, leading to a typi-
cal game theoretical dilemma [41]. Another issue in this di-
rection discusses how the awareness of a disease spreading
affect the contact networks, and subsequently the spreading
dynamics [42]. Or how vaccination and awareness diffusion
can create synergistic effects [43]. Other papers study how
social influence affects the decision to vaccinate ones chil-
dren (e.g. Ref. [44]). To make theoretical vaccination studies
fully realistic and most useful to decision makers, one would
need combine such social aspects with the cost-benefit ap-
proach of this paper.
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